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HighALERT-4208engine: heuristic

Suspected Lateral Movement (SMB)

analyst review

Raw alert — normalized QRadar offense

asset
mail-relay-01
protocol
TCP :445
src_ip
10.33.7.94
dest_ip
10.20.5.9
magnitude
9/10
severity
10/10
credibility
6/10
relevance
7/10
src network
internal_corp
events / flows
162 / 206
triggered rules
  • ▹ Anomaly: Internal Host Scanning Peers
  • ▹ Malware: Reverse Shell Signature Match
full offense JSON
{
  "offense_id": 4208,
  "description": "Suspected Lateral Movement (SMB) :: Infiltration targeting mail-relay-01",
  "offense_type": "Source IP",
  "offense_source": "10.33.7.94",
  "magnitude": 9,
  "severity": 10,
  "credibility": 6,
  "relevance": 7,
  "status": "OPEN",
  "source_network": "internal_corp",
  "destination_networks": [
    "internal_corp"
  ],
  "event_count": 162,
  "flow_count": 206,
  "start_time": "2025-11-03T03:17:00+00:00",
  "last_updated_time": "2025-11-03T03:38:00+00:00",
  "categories": [
    "Malware",
    "Botnet Communication"
  ],
  "rules": [
    "Anomaly: Internal Host Scanning Peers",
    "Malware: Reverse Shell Signature Match"
  ],
  "assigned_to": null,
  "dest_port": 445
}

AI triage

Likely port scan: Suspected Lateral Movement (SMB) from internal host 10.33.7.94 against mail-relay-01 (10.20.5.9) over TCP, 162 events observed.

MITRE ATT&CK
T1570Lateral Tool TransferLateral Movementconfidence 67%

Alert indicators (Suspected Lateral Movement (SMB); rules: Anomaly: Internal Host Scanning Peers) overlap most strongly with T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer among the ATT&CK shortlist.

Priority — High

Scored High based on: QRadar magnitude 9/10; high severity (10/10).

Recommended next steps
  1. 1.Confirm the scan scope: how many destination ports/hosts were touched by the source IP.
  2. 2.Check whether any scanned port returned a SYN-ACK (successful connection) vs. all resets.
  3. 3.Block or rate-limit the source IP at the perimeter if it is external and unrecognized.
  4. 4.Search for follow-on activity from the same source (exploit attempts, logins).
Suggested hunting query (KQL)
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where SourceIP == "10.33.7.94" and DestinationIP == "10.20.5.9"
| summarize Events=count() by DestinationPort, Protocol
| order by Events desc

ATT&CK candidate shortlist — matched before the model was called, so it justifies from real technique IDs

T1570Lateral Tool Transfer·8T1071Application Layer Protocol·6T1021Remote Services·6T1557.001Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay·6T1571Non-Standard Port·5.5T1095Non-Application Layer Protocol·5.5T1105Ingress Tool Transfer·5