HighALERT-4201engine: heuristic

Meterpreter Reverse Shell Pattern

analyst review

Raw alert — normalized QRadar offense

asset: billing-app-01
protocol: TCP :445
src_ip: 10.26.9.109
dest_ip: 10.20.6.21
magnitude: 9/10
severity: 9/10
credibility: 6/10
relevance: 8/10
src network: internal_corp
events / flows: 764 / 482

triggered rules

▹ Anomaly: Internal Host Scanning Peers
▹ Malware: Reverse Shell Signature Match

full offense JSON

{
  "offense_id": 4201,
  "description": "Meterpreter Reverse Shell Pattern :: Infiltration targeting billing-app-01",
  "offense_type": "Source IP",
  "offense_source": "10.26.9.109",
  "magnitude": 9,
  "severity": 9,
  "credibility": 6,
  "relevance": 8,
  "status": "OPEN",
  "source_network": "internal_corp",
  "destination_networks": [
    "internal_corp"
  ],
  "event_count": 764,
  "flow_count": 482,
  "start_time": "2025-11-03T08:11:00+00:00",
  "last_updated_time": "2025-11-03T08:47:00+00:00",
  "categories": [
    "Malware",
    "Botnet Communication"
  ],
  "rules": [
    "Anomaly: Internal Host Scanning Peers",
    "Malware: Reverse Shell Signature Match"
  ],
  "assigned_to": null,
  "dest_port": 445
}

AI triage

Likely port scan: Meterpreter Reverse Shell Pattern from internal host 10.26.9.109 against billing-app-01 (10.20.6.21) over TCP, 764 events observed.

MITRE ATT&CK

T1071Application Layer ProtocolCommand and Controlconfidence 50%

Alert indicators (Meterpreter Reverse Shell Pattern; rules: Anomaly: Internal Host Scanning Peers) overlap most strongly with T1071 Application Layer Protocol among the ATT&CK shortlist.

Priority — High

Scored High based on: QRadar magnitude 9/10; high severity (9/10).

Recommended next steps

1.Confirm the scan scope: how many destination ports/hosts were touched by the source IP.
2.Check whether any scanned port returned a SYN-ACK (successful connection) vs. all resets.
3.Block or rate-limit the source IP at the perimeter if it is external and unrecognized.
4.Search for follow-on activity from the same source (exploit attempts, logins).

Suggested hunting query (KQL)

CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where SourceIP == "10.26.9.109" and DestinationIP == "10.20.6.21"
| summarize Events=count() by DestinationPort, Protocol
| order by Events desc

ATT&CK candidate shortlist — matched before the model was called, so it justifies from real technique IDs

T1071Application Layer Protocol·6T1021Remote Services·6T1571Non-Standard Port·5.5T1095Non-Application Layer Protocol·5.5T1570Lateral Tool Transfer·5.5T1105Ingress Tool Transfer·5T1568Dynamic Resolution·5